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ABSTRACT 
There are currently 3.16 million hectares of woodland cover in the United Kingdom. At a European 
scale, the UK is one of the countries with the lowest woodland cover, currently extending to only 
13% of the total land area of the UK, this is less than half of the European Union (EU) average of 37 
per cent. A significant study carried out by Read et al., (2009) identified that UK wide there is a need 
to increase significantly levels of new planting and forest creation by more than 23,000 ha each year 
over the next 40 years if a substantial influence on reversing climate change is to be realised. It is 
clear that expansion of the total forested area in the UK necessitates the establishment of new 
woodland and forest cover on farmland which is either owner occupied or rented out.   
The main barriers to woodland establishment on farmland cited in the literature, include cultural 
resistance notably a dichotomous view of farming and forestry as being competing land uses; and 
lack of awareness of the potential economic benefits of woodland. This study intended to provide 
information that will improve farmers and landowners understanding of the potential economic 
differences between business as usual (sheep farming) and woodland creation in the uplands of the 
UK. The aim of this study was to evaluate the bio-economic potentials of temperate upland clear fell 
forestry systems in the UK over the last 60 years and determine if afforestation of upland farms has 
historically produced, and will in the future produce better financial outcomes than conventional 
upland sheep farming. The study used a bio-economic model based on discounted cash flow 
analysis to compare and evaluate a conventional upland sheep grazing system against a temperate 
upland forestry system.  
Historic investments to cease upland sheep grazing and afforest upland farms in the UK based on 
historic financial budgeting information available to farmers and landowners in 1956, 1976 would not 
have been an economically viable and profitable land use change compared to continuation of 
upland sheep grazing in the UK. Historic markets in 1956 and 1976 were not strong enough to 
render potential forestry investments profitable without a need for grant assistance.  Investments to 
cease upland sheep grazing and afforest upland farms in the UK in 1996 would have been 
economically viable and profitable land use investment as timber markets alone were strong enough 
to render potential forestry investment profitable without a need for grant assistance. Without 
subsidy, investments to switch from upland sheep grazing and afforest upland farms in 2016 would 
not be an economically viable and profitable land use change. Current day timber markets alone are 
not strong enough to influence new woodland establishment.  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
The benefits of woodland cover are becoming ever clearer, there is growing evidence and 
consensus in academic circles that trees and woodlands play a key role in the mitigation of climate 
change and in ecosystem services delivery. There is a considerable body of evidence and research 
outlining the economic benefits of the forestry sector, the delivery of environmental and social 
benefits from woodlands and the contribution of woodlands to the function and resilience of urban 
and rural landscapes. This is a convincing basis for expanding the current woodland cover of the 
United Kingdom (UK). That being said, UK woodlands and the forestry industry face unparalleled 
challenges, notably climate change, globalisation, increasing demand and competition for natural 
resources, extreme land use pressures, financial constraints and the political upheaval following the 
recent “Brexit” vote. 
1.1 United Kingdom woodland area 
There are currently estimated to be 3.16 million hectares of woodland in the UK (Forestry 
Commission 2016). At a European scale, Wales is one of the countries with the lowest woodland 
cover, currently extending to only 13% of the total land area of the UK, this is less than half of the 
European Union (EU) average of 37 per cent (Forestry Commission, 2016). The overall UK forest 
cover of 13% of the total land area comprises 10% in England, 15% in Wales, 18% in Scotland and 
8% in Northern Ireland (Forestry Commission, 2016). Figure 1 shows the total woodland area by 
constituent country from 1998 to 2016, the graph shows that the overall UK woodland area has 
increased by approximately 240,000 hectares between 1998 and 2016, this equates to an 8% 
increase over the 18-year period (Forestry Commission, 2016).  
!  
Figure 1: Area of UK woodland 1998 to 2016 (Forestry Commission, 2016) 
Figure 2 shows the area of new planting by each constituent UK country since 1976, it is clear that 
the rates of new planting in the UK have fallen since the late 1980’s. The new planting rates have 
decreased by approximately 82% from 1988 and 2010, this decline has been attributed by some 
observers to changes to the tax benefits of forest ownership in the UK brought in by the Finance Act 
1988 (Forestry Commission, 2016). There was a reported increase in the area of new planting in the 
UK between 2010 and 2015 that was approximately twice the level of new planting reported in 2009 
to 2010. The Forestry Commission (2016) new planting statistics note that this increase was driven 
by the introduction of Rural Development Contracts in Scotland. 
It is clear that new planting has decreased in 2015 to 2016 to levels similar to those reported in 
2009 to 2010. The recent decrease in levels of new planting has been attributed by some observers 
to lower than expected levels of uptake of grant assistance (Ellis and Frost, 2002; Church and 
Ravenscroft, 2008; Cunningham, 2009; Wavehill Consulting, 2009; Urquhart et al., 2010; Dandy, 
2012). This has led to concern that government woodland expansion targets might not be met. A 
study carried out by Read et al., (2009) identified that UK wide there is a need to increase 
significantly levels of new planting and forest creation by more than 23,000 ha each year over the 
next 40 years if a substantial influence on reversing climate change is to be realised. 
It is estimated that approximately 27% (equivalent to approximately 853,000 hectares) of the total 
UK woodland area in 2016 is owned or managed by the Forestry Commission, Natural Resources 
Wales and the Forest Service (Forestry Commission, 2016). It is clear that expansion of the total 
forested area in the UK necessitates the establishment of new woodland and forest cover on 
farmland which is either owner occupied or rented out.   
!  
Figure 2: Area of new woodland planting in the UK 1976 to 2016 (Forestry Commission, 2016) 
1.2 United Kingdom upland agricultural area 
Although there is no statutory definition for the 'Uplands', areas above the upper limits of enclosed 
farmland containing dry and wet dwarf shrub heath species and rough grassland are often referred 
to as such (DEFRA 2010). However, in UK rural policy the upland agricultural area is synonymous 
with the EU Less Favoured Area (LFA) designation. The LFA designation covers all the upland and 
hill farming areas of the UK, therefore this paper will consider both upland and hill farming areas as 
“the uplands”. Land with Less Favoured Area (LFA) status accounts for around 45% of the 
agricultural area of the UK (Fraser, 2008). The traditional basis for farming these LFA areas is the 
raising of sheep and beef cattle, with the UK hills and uplands carrying around 12 million breeding 
ewes just over 60% of the UK total (FRASER, 2008). The uplands are areas where farming become 
difficult due to harsher climates, poorer soils, challenging terrain and distance from markets, which 
leads to lower yields and higher production and transportation costs. 
1.3 Understanding landowner decision making in relation to woodland 
creation on farmland 
In the UK forestry is a decentralised policy issue, with each constituent country having its own 
individual forestry policies and strategies. Expansion of the total forested area is a key forest policy 
issue for all of the devolved UK Governments, in some part as a reaction to climate change 
concerns, due to the renewable energy and carbon storage potentials (Forestry Commission, 2007; 
Lawrence and Dandy, 2014). In addition, some observers also note that forestry is becoming a 
major part of the recent move away from the prevailing productivist nature of 20th century land 
management as an attempt to mitigate climate change (Burton, 2004; Elands and Praestholm, 
2008).  
Delivering governmental forestry policy priorities is a substantial problem in the UK where a 
significant proportion of the land is not state owned. Gaining an understanding of the factors 
influencing the decisions made by private landowners (notably farmers) is key to securing the 
delivery of governmental forestry priorities. A regular theme underpinning the majority of the 
literature surrounding forest landowner engagement with forestry policy is that private landowners 
are not achieving governmental forest policy desires (Lawrence and Dandy, 2014). 
1.3.1 The influence of economics in landowner’s decision to plant and manage 
woodlands 
There is evidence to suggest that even though landowners often consider balancing financial costs 
relevant in the decision making process, they do not consider income generation as a primary 
motivation for establishing woodland and forest cover. Some studies found that a small number of 
landowners noted that there is potential for generation of a small income from woodlands 
(Blackstock and Binggeli, 2000; Land Use Consultants, 2007). Conversely other studies found a 
large number of landowners hold a belief that establishment of woodlands and forests will generate 
little economic benefit (McMorran, 2007; Church and Ravenscroft, 2008). A study carried out in 
Wales found that many farmers hold the opinion that financial rewards from the establishment of 
woodland cover are low (Wavehill Consulting, 2009). Equally, a study carried out by Render, (2004) 
in the Chilterns found that 75% of landowners reported management of their woodland returned no 
income. 
UK wide, Glynn et al., (2012) note that only 15% of landowners report their woodlands as profitable 
and 49% reporting their woodlands as financially neutral. Sharpe et al., (2001) identified mixed 
perceptions of poor economics in that many of the landowners were dissuaded from managing their 
woodlands commercially due to concerns over poor profitability. Yet 87% of the same landowners 
would manager their woods commercially if they were only to cover their costs. Ward and Manley, 
(2002) and Leach et al., (2012) reported other economic influences including worries over the loss 
of EU Single Payments (now Basic Payments), land prices, opportunity costs associated with land 
use change and the perceived greater profitability of agriculture. 
Potentially one of the largest financial impacts of tree planting could be a change in land values. 
Generally the more productive the land the greater the loss in capital value when tree planting 
occurs. Planting new woodland on agricultural land could have a variety of impacts on the finances 
of the farm business. On the downside output falls livestock sales and an annual income stream. On 
the plus side variable and some fixed costs could be reduced. It is clear that effects on farm 
business finances is a significant influence on farmers decisions to move away from farming in 
favour of afforestation. 
1.3.2 The influence of grant assistance in landowner’s decision to plant and manage 
woodlands 
There are a number of studies that identify grant assistance as an element of landowner decision 
making, with some evidence suggesting it is a key influence (Nicholls and Young, 2005; Silcock and 
Manley, 2008; Glynn et al., 2012). A particular study carried out by Sharpe et al., (2001) in East 
Anglia notes that 82% of woodland owners felt that financial assistance would influence them to 
commercially manage their woodlands, in addition 73% felt that improved markets would also 
influence them to commercially manage their woodlands. On the other hand, some studies suggest 
that grant assistance has little influence on the decisions made by woodland owners, mainly due to 
economic benefits of ownership being of little concern (Ward and Manley, 2002; Church and 
Ravenscroft, 2008; Leach et al., 2012). 
A number of studies have found that landowners are often dissuaded from interacting with grant 
assistance due to perceived bureaucracy and complex administration (Ellis and Frost, 2002; Church 
and Ravenscroft, 2008; Cunningham, 2009; Wavehill Consulting, 2009; Urquhart et al., 2010; 
Dandy, 2012). What is more, a significant number report that many landowners feel the level of 
grant assistance is not adequate to incentivise new woodland creation (Bateman et al., 1996; Bell, 
1999; Sharpe et al., 2001; Silcock and Manley, 2008; Wavehill Consulting, 2009; Urquhart et al., 
2010).  Some of the more recent studies also noted that landowners were often dis-incentivised 
from engaging with grant assistance due to policy uncertainty, from previous experience of relatively 
frequent policy changes, changes to grant schemes and the risk of crop establishment failure 
leading to grant repayment (Dandy, 2009; Wavehill Consulting, 2009; Urquhart et al., 2010).   
1.3.3 The influence of landowner’s attitudes in decisions to establish and manage 
woodlands 
A recurring theme within the literature is a commonly held negative attitude to woodland and forest 
creation amongst UK landowners. A study in Scotland identified that only 18% of farmers surveyed 
in the Grampian Region had any interest in establishing new woodland (Stubbs et al., 2010). There 
is a body of evidence regarding the attitudes of UK farming culture, notably the widely held opinion 
that agricultural land is for livestock and crop production and too good for planting trees, and the 
majority of farmers want to farm, not grow trees (Allison, 1996; Watkins, 1996; Burton, 2004). In 
addition, UK legislation imposes replanting conditions on the felling of forests, so the decisions to 
afforest agricultural land is an irreversible decision, and not one often taken lightly (Lawrence and 
Dandy, 2014). Furthermore, many farmers take pride in having their land in what farming culture 
considers to be the correct land use for productive land, in most cases livestock and arable 
production (Burton, 2000; Silcock and Manley, 2008). 
1.4 Overview of influencing factors on landowners decisions to establish 
and manage woodlands 
In agricultural landscapes, there is an overruling dichotomous view of farming and forestry being 
competing land uses. There are a number of reasons cited in explanation of the poor engagement 
with woodland creation amongst private landowners, including a strong cultural resistance, 
concerns over loss of food production (Allison, 1996; Watkins et al., 1996; Bell, 1999; Burton, 2004; 
Silcock and Manley, 2008); and a lack of awareness and poor perception of the economic benefits of 
woodland creation and management (Sharpe et al., 2001; Ward and Manley, 2002; Render, 2004; 
Church and Ravenscroft, 2008; Leach et al., 2012). 
There is a clear theme in relation to woodland creation on farmland that many landowners, 
predominantly farmers, gain a significant amount of social capital from having their land in what is 
considered the correct land use, which in many peoples eyes is sheep farming not forestry. Forestry 
is often dismissed by farmers as an economically poor land use choice compared to agriculture, 
therefore they unlikely to decide to turn their land over to forestry. 
1.5 Objectives and scope of current investigations 
This study is intended to investigate the potential economic differences between sheep farming and 
forestry in the uplands of the UK. Financial viability is a major consideration in farmers’ adoption of 
any land use changes, such as afforestation of farmland (Williams, 1988), yet presently, little is 
known about the future and historic farm level economic benefits of conversion of upland 
unimproved pasture to coniferous plantations. There are a number of industry report citing the large 
scale benefits to the UK economy of conversion of upland farms to coniferous plantation (SAC 
Consulting, 2014, 2015), yet there is little evidence of whether conversion is economically 
beneficially at a singular farm level.  
The aim of this study is to evaluate the economic value of temperate upland forestry systems in UK 
and determine if afforestation of the uplands has historically produced, and will in the future produce 
better financial outcomes than continuation of conventional upland sheep farming at farm level. 
More specifically, this study will conduct bio-economic modelling based on discounted cash flow 
analysis (DCF) to compare and evaluate a conventional upland sheep grazing system against a 
temperate upland clear fell forestry system.  
Figure 2 shows the area of new planting by each constituent UK country since 1976, the overall 
downward trend in new planting rates suggests that forestry was historically a more economically 
viable land use choice than upland sheep farming. Recent low rates of new afforestation would 
suggest that forestry is now a economically poor land use choice compared to sheep farming, 
hence farmers are reluctant to afforest their land. Therefore this study is based on the following two 
hypotheses: 
1. An upland clear fell forestry system was historically a more economically viable land use option 
than an conventional upland sheep grazing system; and 
2. a conventional upland sheep grazing system is currently in 2016 a more economically viable 
land use option than an upland clear fell forestry system. 
2.0 METHODS 
2.1 Farm analysis methodology 
The study compared the relative profitability of two upland land use systems using a discounted 
cash flow analysis model based on standard agricultural and forest industry financial budgeting data 
commencing at a number of historic points in time. The following land use scenarios were 
compared: 
Scenario 1: Conventional hill sheep system – spring lambing from unimproved pasture. 
Scenario 2: Upland conifer plantation system – 2500 stems/ha-1 planted on previously grazed 
unimproved pasture, assuming that agricultural operations were to be abandoned. 
Each scenario was compared using discounted cash flow analysis commencing at four periods in 
time; 1956, 1976, 1996 and 2016 over a period dictated by an upland conifer rotation of 50 years 
typical of historic planting decisions, to determine if forestry would have been more economically 
viable than agriculture in the past and if forestry is likely be more economically viable than 
agriculture in the future.  
The study modelled the economic viability of the two land uses systems across three notional model 
hill farm of three sizes, assuming that in the case of Scenario 1, agricultural operations carried on 
unchanged and in the case of scenario 2, agricultural operations were abandoned and the whole 
farm area was converted to a conifer plantation. Due to extremely changeable nature of historic 
agricultural subsidy and forestry grant regimes the historic comparisons were undertaken taking no 
account of government subsidy. The 2016 comparison was initially undertaken taking no account of 
agricultural subsidy and forestry grant income, however a sensitivity analysis was subsequently 
undertaken to assess the impacts of these additional non market incomes on the results. The 
comparisons were undertaken on the assumption that conversion was one way from sheep farming 
to afforestation. 
2.2 Farm level model 
2.2.1 Model outline 
The bio-economic model used in this study was developed as a multi period, whole farm analysis 
tool to assess the relative profitability of a whole farm land use change from upland hill sheep to 
upland conifer plantation forestry. The platform used to develop the bio-economic model was 
Microsoft Excel Mac, version Office 365 and consists of eight main worksheets accommodating the 
comparison of two land use enterprises across three model farm sizes.  
The model inputs were: 
a) Comparison years and model farm sizes; 
b) Enterprise specific output prices, enterprise specific variable costs and enterprise specific fixed 
costs; 
c) Enterprise specific performance data, production yields and stocking rates; 
d) Discount rate 
The model outputs were; 
a) Discounted cash flows for each land use scenario across each comparison period; and 
b) Measures of profitability and economic worth for each land use scenario. 
Although the average farm size in Wales is only 40 hectares and the average flock size in wales is 
only 680 ewes and lambs (UK government, 2015), this study aimed to investigate and compare the 
relative economic viability of hill sheep agriculture with forestry across a range of holding sizes 
broadly representative of a range hill farms in The UK.  
This study compared agriculture and forestry across three hill farm sizes classified small, medium 
and large. The holding sizes were calculated using the European Size Unit (ESU). The UK 
government Agricultural Statistics (2015) state that 29.3 breeding ewes are required for one ESU 
and that small holdings are ≥8 and <40 ESU, medium holdings are ≥40 and <100 ESU and large 
holdings are ≥100 and <200 ESU. The model farm sizes used in this study were calculated using 
the following formula: 
!  
Where a = median point in UK government size criteria, b = ewes required for one ESU and c = 
average hill sheep stocking rate per hectare. 
The calculation of the three model farm sizes used in this study is presented in Table 1. 
2.2.2 Model reference farms  
Table 1: Calculation of model farm sizes based on European Size Units 
2.2.3 Scenario 1: Conventional hill sheep spring lambing system 
Model analysis of the conventional hill sheep spring lambing system aimed to illustrate the relative 
economic viability of a hill sheep farming enterprise typical of The UK. This scenario modelled the 
profitability and economic viability of a conventional hill spring lambing system, where lambs are 
sold off unimproved pasture. Income within the system is derived from the annual sale of lambs, 
wool and cull ewes and rams.  
The general assumptions included within the discounted cash flow for the conventional hill sheep 
grazing system are as follows.  
2.2.4 Conventional hill sheep spring lambing system assumptions 
a) The performance data, costs of inputs and output prices are known and remain constant 
throughout the 60-year projection period. 
Model farm size =   a  ×  b
c
Size Group Small Medium Large
UK government size criteria (ESU) ≥8 & <40 ≥40 & <100 ≥100 & <200
Median point in UK government size criteria 
(ESU) 28 70 150
Ewes required for one ESU (head) 29.3 29.3 29.3
Flock size (head) 820 2050 4030
Average hill farm stocking rate (ewes/ha) 9 9 9
Farm Size (ha) 90 230 470
b) All costs were incurred commencing in year 1 through to year 60, whilst all revenues were 
realised commencing in year 2 through to year 60. 
c) A flock of traditional welsh mountain sheep were introduced onto unimproved pasture at a 
stocking rate of 9 ewes/ha-1 and 1 ram to 50 ewes. 
d) Lambs sold per 100 ewes put to ram varied by comparison year, 45 in 1956 and 1976, 75 in 
1996 and 141 in 2016. 
e) An average lamb live weight for sale of 41kg was assumed. 
f) Ewe and ram replacements were assumed at a rate of 23% annually. 
g) 19% of the flock is culled annually, allowing for 4% mortality. 
h) Variable costs for vets and meds includes worming, vaccinations, fly treatments and feet 
treatments. 
i) Miscellaneous costs include contract shearing, scanning, lamb ear tags, carcass disposal, straw, 
mineral licks, marketing levy and transport costs. 
j) Forage costs are based on low input unimproved permanent pasture. 
k) Fixed costs include labour (paid and unpaid), power running costs, machinery running costs, 
rent, finance costs, general overheads and farm maintenance. 
l) It is assumed that the market remains perfect and the discount rate of 3% remains constant over 
the projection period. 
m) All budgets and cash flows are calculated and expressed in British Pounds Sterling. 
The above stated assumptions were derived from the John Nix Farm Management Pocketbook, 8th, 
26th and 46th Editions, (Nix, 1976; Nix, 1995: Redman, 2015) 
2.2.5 Data Collection – Farm financial costs and enterprise performance data 
Hill sheep spring lambing financial costs, performance data and output prices were sourced and 
adapted from following standard industry farm management and budgeting literature for the 
commencing year in each discounted cash flow comparison: 
a) 2016 - John Nix Farm Management Pocketbook 46th Edition 2016 (Redman, 2015) 
b) 1996 – John Nix Farm Management Pocketbook 26th Edition 1996 (Nix and Hill, 1995) 
c) 1976 – John Nix Farm Management Pocketbook 7th Edition 1977 (Nix, 1976) 
d) 1956 – Due to lack of standard industry farm management and budgeting information relevant to 
this period in time, figures from John Nix Farm Management Pocketbook 7th Edition 1976 (Nix, 
1976) were discounted using the prevailing Retail Price Index back to get an estimate of 1956 
figures. Estimates for 1956 figures were also informed by House of Commons Briefing Paper - 
Agriculture: Historical Statistics (Zayed, 2016) 
Where the financial budgeting information is quoted as a range of figures in the standard industry 
literature, a median point figure was taken for inclusion in the bio-economic model. 
It must be noted that the financial costs and revenues detailed in the enterprise budgets and cash 
flow are only projections and estimates and are only approximations of the circumstances of real 
farming businesses. 
The assumptions regarding unit costs and unit revenues for the conventional hill sheep spring 
lambing system are summarised in Appendix A and the budget for the hill sheep spring lambing 
system is presented at Appendix C. 
2.2.6 Scenario 2: Upland conifer plantation system 
This scenario aimed to model relative economic viability of a single upland conifer rotation typical of 
The UK where income is derived from timber sales from thinning operations and final clear fell 
harvest. This scenario assumed that all agricultural operations on the farm were abandoned and the 
whole farm area was planted with Sitka spruce (Picea sitchensis). The mean yield class for Sitka 
spruce in the UK is 14m3/ha/year although many sites are potentially more or less productive 
(Bateman and Lovett, 1998; Sing et al., 2006). Therefore it is assumed that Sitka spruce was 
established at 2m x 2m spacing at a stocking density of 2500 stems/ha-1 and the crop grew at a 
maximum annual increment of 14m3/ha/year (yield class 14). Growth and yield data was derived 
from the Forestry Commission Yield Models for Sitka spruce, YC 14 – Intermediate thinning 
(Edwards and Christie, 1981).  
The predicted thinning and harvest yields for the upland conifer plantation system is presented in 
Appendix B. 
It is assumed the plantation was managed and maintained on a 50-year rotation with thinning 
undertaken at the marginal thinning intensity (70% of the mean maximum annual increment) on a 6-
year cycle (Rollinson, 1988). Felling will be undertaken starting in year 51 with one tenth of the 
forest being felled each year over the following ten years with a 5 year gap between felling of 
adjacent areas. It is assumed all operations were carried out by contractors and all timber sales 
were carried out through standing sales (both thinning operations and final harvest). 
It is assumed that the market remains perfect and the discount rate of 3% remains constant over the 
projection period. All budgets and cash flows are calculated and expressed in British Pounds 
Sterling. 
2.2.7 Data Collection - Forestry financial costs and enterprise performance data 
Upland conifer plantation forestry financial costs, performance data and output prices were sourced 
and adapted from following standard industry forestry management and budgeting literature for the 
commencing year in each discounted cash flow comparison: 
a) 2016 - John Nix Farm Management Pocketbook 46th Edition 2016 (Redman, 2015), Forestry 
Commission Timber Price Indices: Data to March 2017 (Forestry Commission, 2017) 
b) 1996 – John Nix Farm Management Pocketbook 26th Edition 1996 (Nix and Hill, 1995), Forestry 
Commission Timber Price Indices: Data to March 2017 (Forestry Commission, 2017) 
c) 1976 – Growing trees for profit (Deal, 1974) 
d) 1956 – Economics of Plantations (Hiley, 1956) 
It must be noted that the financial costs and revenues detailed in the enterprise budgets and cash 
flow are only projections and estimates and are only approximations of the circumstances of real 
forestry businesses. 
Where the financial budgeting information is quoted as a range of figures in the standard industry 
literature, a median point figure was taken for inclusion in the bio-economic model. 
The assumptions regarding unit costs and unit revenues for the upland conifer plantation system 
are summarised in Appendix B and the budget for the upland conifer plantation system is presented 
at Appendix D. 
2.3 Farm level model economic analysis 
It is assumed that land is allocated by farmers to the land use choice with the highest net returns. 
Land can be allocated to either of the two land uses, farming and forestry. It is assumed that land in 
farming use would be converted to forestry when the expected returns when the land use is in 
forestry are greater than when the land is in use for farming. The method of economic analysis used 
to evaluate the relative economic viability of each enterprise scenario in the bio-economic model 
was Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) analysis. 
2.3.1 Cash flow budget 
Initial cash flow budgets for the two enterprise scenarios (hill farming and forestry) across each 
holding size (small, medium and large) were constructed commencing at each of the four periods in 
time (1956, 1976, 1996 and 2016) based on the revenues and costs detailed in the enterprise 
budgets at Appendix 3 and 4. In total 24 cash flow budgets were constructed. The cash flow 
budgets present a temporal account of when costs are incurred and when revenues are realised. 
The cash flow budgets provide a snapshot of future financial commitments and economic viability of 
each of the two enterprise scenarios at each of the four periods in time. The annual net cash flow 
was calculated by subtracting the total annual costs and the total annual revenues. 
2.3.2 Discounted cash flow budget 
To reduce the future costs and revenues included in the cash flows budgets to their present day 
value a standard real discount rate of 3% was adopted on the recommendations of Hepburn and 
Koundouri (2006) and the HM Treasury Green Book (HM Treasury, 2003) due to the 60-year length 
of the investment period. Discount factors were calculated using the adopted discount rate of 3% to 
reduce future costs and revenues back to the present value at the commencing year of the cash 
flow period. The discount factor was calculated using the following formula: 
!  
Where r = discount rate and t = number of years until the cost or revenue is realised 
2.3.3 Discounted cash flow analysis 
Using the outputs of the discounted cash flow, two methods of assessing the worth of each 
enterprise were used to compare the relative economic viability respectively. The two methods used 
were: the net present value (NPV), and annual equivalent value (AEV) as these are a commonly 
used approach. The same starting point of year 1 and projection duration of 60 years were used in 
each comparison respectively. Due to the significant time delays between afforestation and 
realisation of income through felling compared to the annual incomes from sheep farming, the future 
net returns of both land use choices need to considered at their “present day” value using the NPV 
to allow for comparison. in addition due to farming incomes being annual and forestry incomes 
arising at the end of the rotation, the AEV is used to allow for comparison of the annual incomes of 
each land use choice. 
2.3.4 Net present value 
NPV was employed as an investment decision making tool to compare the alternative enterprise 
options to seek the most profitable or economically viable option. Net present value is a technique 
used to discount all net future income streams to their present value (Hiley, 1954 & 1956). The NPV 
of each enterprise choice across each holding size and each time period was calculated as the sum 
all the discounted cash flows throughout the life of the project using the standard discount rate of 
3% using the following formula: 
!  
Where, t = rotation year, Bt = revenues in each project year, Ct = costs in each project year, n = 
number of years until the end of the project (n ranges from 1 to 60) and r = discount rate (3%). 
2.3.5 Annual Equivalent Value 
The previously calculated NPV figures were used to calculate the AEV (equivalent yearly income 
from each enterprise option) for each enterprise option. Calculation of the AEV involved deriving the 
expected annual income potential of alternative enterprise options by estimating the continuous 
annual cash flow generated over the lifespan of the investment. The AEV of the enterprise options 
was calculated using the following formula: 
!  








Annual Equivalent Value =   r (NPV)1 − (1 + r)−n
Where, NPV = net present value, r = rate for investment period and n = number of years in 
investment period. 
2.3.6 Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analyses was undertaken to test the effects of the variation in the following key variables: 
a) Lamb price – the baseline lamb prices in each cash flow commencement year were increased 
and decreased by 10% respectively. 
b) Timber prices – the baseline timber prices in each cash flow commencement year were 
increased and decreased by 10% respectively. 
c) Discount rate – the baseline discount rate of 3% was substituted for a discount rate of 2, and 
4% respectively 
d) Addition of prevailing forestry grant and agricultural subsidy incomes to 2016 discounted cash 
flow. The estimated additional incomes accounted for in the discounted cash flows are as 
follows: 
 Agricultural Subsidy - Average UK LFA Basic Payment Scheme income of £160/hectare. 
  
 Forestry Grant Scheme - Average UK Woodland Creation Grant income for new planting with  
conifer of £4,000 per hectare. 
3.0 RESULTS 
3.1 Discounted cash flow comparison results 
The estimated NPV figures for the comparison of the two scenarios are presented in table 2 and 
figure 3. The estimated AEV figures for the comparison of the two scenarios are presented in table 3 
and 4. A detailed overview of the results is presented in Appendix 3, Section A. 
Table 2: NPV/Ha comparison results 
Table 3: AEV/Ha comparison results 
3.1.1 1956 and 1976 Discounted cash flow comparison  
At a discount rate of 3% in 1956 and 1976, both a continuation of sheep farming and an investment 
in forestry are economically unviable with negative NPV/Ha figures. In addition, whilst the AEV/Ha 
figures for both land use choices are negative, the annual losses per hectare for a forestry 
investment are significantly smaller than for continuation of sheep farming. For upland farmers of all 
the model farm sizes in the UK in 1956 and 1976, a decision to afforest their holding would have 
secured lower annual and overall financial losses than a decision to continue with sheep farming if 
farming subsidies and forestry grant incomes had not been available.  




1956 -1,419.14 -1,248.10 -1,248.10
1976 -4,395.72 -3,307.99 -3,968.13
1996 -8,208.31 -8,208.31 -8,208.31
2016 -12,549.85 -10,696.97 -10,982.03
Forestry Option 
NPV/Ha (£)
1956 -70.645 -70.23 -69.99
1976 -341 -239.60 -322.03
1996 285.06 287.03 403.62
2016 -951.79 -1,024.28 -1,023.44




1956 -49.59 -43.41 -43.41
1976 -158.83 -119.53 -143.38
1996 -296.59 -296.59 -296.59
2016 -453.46 -386.51 -396.81
Forestry Option 
AEV/Ha (£)
1956 -2.55 -2.54 -2.53
1976 -12.32 -8.66 -11.64
1996 10.30 10.37 14.58
2016 -34.99 -37.01 -36.98
3.1.2 1996 Discounted cash flow comparison 
At a discount rate of 3% in 1996 an investment in forestry was economically viable with a positive 
NPV/Ha figure, whereas a continuation of sheep farming remained economically unviable with a 
negative NPV/Ha figure. An investment in returns a positive AEV/Ha figure whereas a continuation 
of sheep farming continues to make significant annual losses with a negative AEV/Ha figure. The 
results of the 1996 discounted cash flow comparison indicate that forestry was a more economically 
viable land use choice than continuing with upland sheep farming. For upland farmers of all of the 
model farm sizes in the UK in 1996, a decision to afforest their holding would have been an 
economically viable and profitable land use change. 
3.1.4 2016 Discounted cash flow comparison 
In 2016 both a continuation of sheep farming and an investment in forestry are economically 
unviable with negative NPV/Ha figures at a discount rate of 3%. In addition, whilst the AEV/Ha 
figures for both land use choices are negative, the annual losses per hectare for a forestry 
investment are significantly smaller than for continuation of sheep farming. For upland farmers of all 
the model farm sizes in the UK in 1996, a decision to afforest their holding would have secured 
lower annual and overall financial losses than a decision to continue with sheep farming if farming 
subsidies and forestry grant incomes had not been available. 
Figure 3: Net present value per hectare  
Figure 4: Annual equivalent value per hectare 
3.2 Sensitivity analysis results – variation in timber and livestock sale 
prices. 
The following describes the sensitivity of the results of the discounted cash flow analysis to a 10% 
increase and decrease in output prices at each of the discounted cash flow commencement years. 
The results of the effect of a 10% increase and decease in output prices on the NPV/Ha and AEV/
Ha figures for each scenario are shown in Appendix 3, Section B along with a detailed overview of 
the results. 
A 10% increase in the output prices for both timber and livestock sales does not significantly alter 
the relative economic viability of the investment options, and agriculture and forestry remain 
economically unviable land use choices in 1956 and 1976. As both land use choices returned 
negative NPV figures, a 10% decrease had no effect on the relative economic viability of the land 
use options. In 1996, a 10% increase in the output prices for both timber and livestock sales does 
not significantly alter the relative economic viability of the investment options, and agriculture 
remains an economically unviable enterprise compared to an investment in forestry which remains 
economically viable. In addition, a 10% decrease in output prices does not reduce the relative 
economic viability of an investment in forestry and it remains a more economically viable land use 
investment than agriculture in 1996. Much like in 1956 and 1976, a 10% increase in the output 
prices for both timber and livestock sales does not significantly alter the relative economic viability of 
the investment options, and both agriculture and forestry remain an economically unviable 
investment choice in 2016. A 10% decrease in the output prices for both timber and livestock sales 
does not alter the relative economic viability of the investment options and both enterprise choices 
remain economically unviable. In 2016, regardless of an increase or decrease in output prices, a 
choice to afforest farmland accrues smaller annual losses than a decision to continue with upland 
sheep grazing. 
3.3 Sensitivity analysis results –  variation in discount rate 
The following describes the sensitivity of the results of the discounted cash flow analysis to a 
increase in discount rate to 4% and decrease in discount rate to 3% at each of the discounted cash 
flow commencement years.The results of the effect of an increase and decease in discount rate on 
the NPV/Ha and AEV/Ha for each scenario are shown in table 6 and 7 in Appendix 3, Section C 
along with a detailed overview of the results. 
3.3.1 1956 Discounted cash flow comparison 
A decrease in the discount rate to 2% the forestry investment option becomes economically viable 
with a positive NPV/Ha and AEV/Ha. At a discount rate of 2% the forestry option becomes an 
economically viable land use option with a significant increase in NPV/Ha and AEV/HA. Agriculture 
remains an economically unviable investment option at a discount rate of 2%. At an increased 
discount rate of 4% agriculture remains an economically unviable investment option, although as 
the discount rate increases, the relative economic unviability steadily decreases with an increase in 
NPV/Ha and AEV/Ha. At an increase in discount rate to 4% the forestry option remains an 
economically unviable investment option. 
3.3.2 1976 Discounted cash flow comparison 
A decrease in the discount rate to 2% increases the economic viability with a positive NPV and AEV/
Ha of the forestry investment option in medium sized holdings only whereas the forestry option on 
small and large holdings remains economically unviable. Agriculture remains an economically 
unviable investment option at a discount rate of 2%. At an increased discount rate of 4% agriculture 
remains an economically unviable investment option, although as the discount rate increases, the 
relative economic unviability steadily decreases with an increase in NPV/Ha and AEV/Ha. In 
addition, an increase in discount rate to 4% renders the forestry options an economically unviable 
investment option, and the unviability increases as discount rate increases. 
3.3.3 1996 Discounted cash flow comparison 
A decrease in the discount rate to 2% increases the economic viability of the forestry investment 
option, compared to the baseline discount rate of 3% with an increase in the previously positive 
NPV and AEV/Ha.  At a decreased discount rate of 2% forestry remains an economically viable land 
use choice. Agriculture remains an economically unviable investment option at a discount rate of 
2%. At an increased discount rate of 4% agriculture remains an economically unviable investment 
option, although as the discount rate increases, the relative economic unviability steadily decreases. 
With an increase in discount rate to 4% forestry becomes an economically viable investment choice.  
3.3.4 2016 Discounted cash flow comparison 
Agriculture remains an economically unviable investment option at a decreased discount rate of 2%. 
Forestry becomes economically viable at a decreased discount rate of 2%. At an increased discount 
rate of 4% and 5%, agriculture remains an economically unviable investment option, although as the 
discount rate increases, the relative economic unviability steadily decreases with an increase in the 
NPV and AEV/Ha. In addition, with an increase in discount rate to 4% forestry remains an 
economically unviable investment choice. 
3.4 Sensitivity analysis results –  addition of subsidy and grant incomes 
The results of the addition of agricultural subsidy and forestry grant incomes on the NPV/Ha and 
AEV/Ha for each scenario are shown in table 8 and 9 and figure 5 and 6. 
The addition of Basic Payment Scheme incomes into the agriculture option at £160/ha has reduced 
the relative economic unviability (NPV/Ha of around -£5,500 to -£7,000 and AEV/HA of around -
£100 to -£250) compared to a continuation of agriculture  option without subsidy (NPV/Ha of around 
-£10,000 to -£12,000 and AEV/Ha of around -£380 to -£450).  Even with the addition of subsidy 
income the agricultural option does remain an economically unviable land use option. The addition 
of Woodland creation Grant incomes into the forestry discounted cash flow at £4,000/ha has 
improved the relative economic viability (NPV/Ha of around £3,000 and AEV/Ha of around £110) 
compared to a land use investment in forestry without grant incomes (NPV/Ha of around -£380 to 
£450 and AEV/Ha of around -£36). With the additional income from woodland creation grants, a 
land use investment in forestry is a financially viable decision in 2016. 
Table 8: Sensitivity of  2016 NPV/Ha to addition of agricultural subsidy and forestry grants  
 
Figure 5: Sensitivity of NPV/Ha to addition of forestry grant and agricultural subsidy income 
Scenario Establishment year Farm Size No subsidy or grant income
















Table 9: Sensitivity of  2016 AEV/Ha to addition of agricultural subsidy and forestry grants 
 
Figure 6: Sensitivity of AEV/Ha to addition of forestry grant and agricultural subsidy income 
Scenario Establishment year Farm Size No subsidy or grant 
income

















This study is intended to investigate the potential economic differences between sheep farming and 
forestry in the uplands of the UK. This study aimed to evaluate the economic viability and potential 
profitability of a temperate upland clear fell forestry system in The UK compared to a business as 
usual continuation of upland sheep farming.Bio-economic modelling based on discounted cash flow 
analysis was used for the comparison and evaluation of a conventional upland sheep grazing 
system with a temperate upland clear fell forestry system across a range of holding sizes typical of 
the uplands of the UK. 
4.1 Results of the present investigation 
Without subsidy a historic decision to afforest upland farms on a 50 year rotation would have not 
have been a more economically viable land use decision compared to a continuation of upland 
sheep grazing based on financial budgeting information available to landowners in 1956 and 1976. 
This is due to the relatively low timber prices compared to the establishment costs and the length of 
time between expenditure on establishment and the realisation of timber incomes from thinning and 
clear felling. Ceasing sheep farming and move to forestry in 1996 would have been an economically 
viable land use decision without subsidy. This is due to the timber prices being significantly higher 
than the establishment costs, so even when incomes are discounted to the beginning of the 
investment period, the NPV and AEV figures per hectare remain positive. A decision to afforest 
upland farms based on budgeting information available to landowners in 2016 would not be an 
economically viable or profitable land use investment without subsidy, this is mainly due to a 
reduction in timber prices relative to an increase in establishment costs compared to previous 
comparison years. Even though the timber incomes are still higher than the costs, when the 
incomes are discounted, the NPV and AEV figures per hectare end up negative due to the 
establishment costs being relatively high. In all cases upland sheep grazing is economically 
unviable at current prices in the absence of subsidy, this is due to the input and management costs 
exceeding the output prices, the discounting of these losses only exacerbates the losses. Even 
though the forestry land use option is still economically unviable in the absence subsidy, the overall 
financial losses are significantly lower that those associated with continuation of sheep farming. 
4.1.2 Effects of variation in the output prices on the results 
An increase in output prices had a mixed influence on the economic viability of the land use 
investments. A 10% increase in historic timber prices decreased the financial losses associated with 
a forestry investment in 1956 and 1976, but it still remains an economically unviable land use 
decision. As expected a 10% increase in timber prices increased the economic viability of a forestry 
investment in 1996. In 2016, even with a 10% increase in timber prices, forestry remains 
economically unviable. With a 10% increase in output prices agriculture remains an economically 
unviable land use investment both historically and in 2016.  A 10% decrease in timber prices further 
increased the financial losses of a forestry investment in 1956, 1976 and 2016 and it remained an 
economically unviable land use investment. However a 10% decrease in 1996 timber prices had 
little effect on the economic viability of a forestry investment and it remained and economically 
viable land use decision. A 10% decrease in agricultural output prices further increased the financial 
losses of a continuation of agriculture in 1956, 1976,1996 and 2016 and it remained an 
economically unviable land use investment. In 1996 the relative economic viability and profitability of 
a forestry investment is due to the margin between timber prices and establishment and 
maintenance costs being large enough that the effect of discounting was not significant enough to 
render the NPV negative regardless of variation in timber prices. In 1956, 1976 and 2016 the margin 
between the timber prices and establishment and maintenance costs is clearly not large enough to 
overcome the effects of discounting and the NPV was rendered negative, even though actual 
realised timber incomes exceed the establishment and maintenance costs. Even with an increase in 
output prices, the margin between agricultural output prices and input and management costs 
remains negative, still rendering the continuation of agriculture an economically unviable land use 
decision. 
By altering the percentage increase timber and agricultural output prices in the discounted cash 
flows, it is clear that there will be a need for quite significant increases in output prices for forestry 
and agriculture to become economically viable land use investments in 2016. For small farms, a 
26% increase in timber prices would be required to increase the NPV/Ha to £21.13 and AEV/Ha to 
£0.76 compared to a very large 47% increase in agricultural output prices required to increase the 
NPV/Ha to £165.16 and AEV/Ha to £5.97. For medium farms, a significant 29% increase in timber 
prices would be required to increase the NPV/Ha to £22.91 and AEV/HA to £0.83 compared to a 
very large 41% increase in agricultural output prices required to increase the NPV/Ha to £222.52 
and AEV/Ha to £8.04. For large farms, also a large 29% increase would be required to increase the 
NPV/Ha to £23.74 and AEV/Ha to £0.86 compared to a very large 41% increase in agricultural 
output prices required to increase the NPV/Ha to £222.52 and AEV/Ha to £8.04. Recent political 
changes in the UK notably the decision to exit the European Union raises the question as to 
whether these increases in timber  and agricultural output prices are realistic. The recent fall in the 
value of the Pound against the Euro would likely results in an increase in UK timber and agricultural 
output prices, it is however unlikely that significant increases of timber prices of around 26-29% and 
increases in agricultural output prices of around 41-47% will be realised.  
4.1.3 Effects of variation in discount rate on the results 
The choice of discount rate can greatly affect the profitability and economic viability of and land use 
investment. There is body of literature surrounding forest investment economics reporting that high 
discount rates can significantly reduce the NPV value of a forestry investment where the incomes 
are accrued late in the lifespan of the investment and often increases the NPV of land use 
investment where incomes are accrued earlier in the lifespan of the investment. The results of this 
study followed broadly the same trends. As expected, where the discount rate was reduced in the 
bio-economic model to 2%, historically a forest investment in across all farm sizes in 1956 and only 
medium farms in 1976 became economically viable where it had previously been economically 
unviable at 3% with a negative NPV figure. On small and large farms in 1976 an decrease in 
discount rate to 2% the NPV figures remain negative, meaning a forestry investment remains 
economically unviable. In addition, a forest investment decision in 2016 became economically viable 
with a positive NPV figure at a discount rate of 2%, where it was previously economically unviable at 
a discount rate of 3%. With an increase in discount rate to 4% a forestry investment remained 
economically unviable in 1956, 1976 and 2016 with a negative NPV figure and becomes 
economically unviable in 1996 with a now negative NPV figure. With a decrease in the discount rate 
to 2% the economic viability of the historic and present day  continuation of agriculture decreases 
further with negative NPV figure. As expected, as the discount rate increased to 4%, the economic 
unviability of the continuation of upland sheep grazing decreased with an increase in NPV figure. As 
the agriculture option made significant annual losses across all farm sizes, no matter how high the 
discount rate would become, upland sheep grazing would not become economically viable, unless 
the incomes significantly exceed the costs.  
It is clear that when comparing land use investments where incomes are derived on a differing time 
scale, (notably agriculture where incomes and are annual and forestry where incomes are realised 
after a gap of a number of year following expenditure) that the discount rate can have a significant 
effect. It can be seen from the results of this investigation that in long term investments when higher 
rates of interest are used the investment is likely to be less profitable. Conversely when the time 
between expenditure and incomes is short, as in the case of agriculture, higher investment rates 
increase the relative economic viability. If the discount rate is low, the investment can withstand a 
long period of time before realisation of returns and still often remain profitable. Williams (1988) 
presents a concise explanation of this relationship, he notes that the formula used to determine the 
compound interest factor (1.0pn) can be used to explain the relative effect of discount rate and time 
between expenditure and incomes. In the formula, p is the rate of interest and n is the number of 
years of the investment. One can see that the rate of interest is raised by the power of the number 
of years of the investment (Williams, 1988).  The number of years of the investment raises the effect 
of the discount factor exponentially and at the higher discount rates, the bigger the influence of the 
number of years is on relative profitability and economic viability of the investment (Williams, 1988). 
The conclusion can be drawn that when higher discount rates are used, the period of time between 
expenditures and incomes must be short for the investment to remain profitable. In forestry where 
the investment timescale is much longer than other land use investment, it is clear that the discount 
rate used in the investment analysis has a significant effect on the profitability of the decision. 
4.1.4 Effects of subsidy and grant incomes on results 
The results of this study have shown that neither continuation of sheep farming nor a land use 
investment in forestry based on financial budgeting information available to landowners in 2016 
would have been economically viable without subsidy. It is highly unlikely that without subsidy, 
farmers would be able to continue farming making annual losses of around £400/Ha. Furthermore it 
is also highly unlikely that farmers would look to turn their land over to forestry without grant 
incomes, when the huge initial investment still makes equivalent annual losses of around £35/Ha. 
With an addition of Woodland Creation Grant incomes at £4,000/Ha a conversion from sheep 
farming to forestry based on 2016 financial budgeting information would now be an economically 
viable land use investment, now returning the equivalent annual return of about £110/Ha. However, 
with the addition of Basic Payment Scheme incomes at £160/Ha a continuation of sheep farming in 
the uplands still makes a loss of around £100 to £250/Ha. As financial viability is a major 
consideration in farmers’ adoption of any land use changes, such as afforestation of farmland 
(Williams, 1988), the cultural resistance to afforesting farmland must be strong, as even with 
subsidy a continuation of sheep farming in the uplands is still not economically viable.  It would be 
fair to say  that most farmers would not be able to farm at a loss for very long, hence they must be 
able to derive other additional incomes such as secondary employment (contracting), agri-
environment schemes and other farm diversification schemes that keep upland farming profitable. 
4.1.5 Results of the present investigation in relation to previous studies  
There is body of literature that found many farmers felt forest establishment and management will 
generate little economic benefit and will not be profitable. The results of this current study support 
and augment these previous findings. This study has shown that a historic decisions in 1956 and 
1976 to establish forests in the uplands of the UK on previously grazed land would also have not 
been economically viable without grant incomes and generated little economic benefit other than a 
reduction in the annual losses associated with sheep farming. The high levels of forestry planting 
during this time might have been attributed to state purchase of upland farmland by the forestry 
commission or a greater engagement with forestry grant schemes. An interesting finding of this 
study is the relative economic viability, without grant incomes, of a land use investment in forestry in 
1996 compared to economic unviability of a continuation of upland sheep farming. This was due to a 
significant increase in timber prices compared to previous comparison years. 
A decision to establish forests in the uplands of the UK in 2016 on land previously used for sheep 
grazing generates is not economically viable without grant incomes and generates little economic 
benefit other than a reduction in the annual losses associated with sheep farming. However with an 
addition of prevailing Woodland Creation Grant incomes conversion of grazing land to forestry 
would be an economically viable and profitable land use option. Despite what is often reported, 
many farmers are aware of rural policy priorities and the benefits and disadvantages of pursuing 
different management and land use options and the financial incentives attached to these. It is fair 
to say that many farmers take a considered view as to whether afforestation is an economically 
worthwhile land use change. The results of this study suggest the low levels of planting on farmland 
and lack of engagement with forestry grant schemes could be due to farmers giving a greater 
relative consideration to the loss of annual incomes, reduction in land values, loss of food 
production and farming livelihood in their decision making process.  It is likely that the change in 
structure of the cashflow will have a significant effect on the decision to invest in forestry or not. The 
large delay between investment in tree planting and realisation of incomes through timber means 
that due to the ageing nature of upland farmers, many will not see the tangible financial outcomes of 
the large initial outlay. Unlike agriculture where there is a tangible annual income, there is no 
tangible annual income with forestry. However, on farms where there is no plan for succession 
following the retirement of the current farmer, an investment in forestry, even when it may seem 
financially unviable today, may bee seen as a worthwhile investment for future generations hoping 
that timber values will significantly increase. 
There is a recurring theme within the literature that many farmers and landowners are put off from 
engaging with government grant assistance due to concerns surrounding the bureaucracy and 
complexity of administration and worries that the grant incomes are not high enough to make 
woodland creation economically viable. This research has found that without grant income an 
investment in forestry in 2016 is not profitable and markets alone are not sufficient to influence new 
planting of woodland in the uplands of the UK, but with an addition of grant incomes an investment 
in forestry is economically viable. This should raise a critical concern for UK government policy 
makers, there is clearly something wrong with grant scheme rules and administration if levels of 
grant uptake are as low as reported. There is a need for policy makers to engage with landowners 
to determine exactly what elements of the scheme administration or rules puts them off from 
engaging with them.  An additional recurring theme within the literature was a feeling amongst forest 
owners that management of existing forests and woodlands would not generate any economic 
benefit, this study has shown that management of existing forests is likely to be profitable for the 
landowners as the costs were borne at a time when they were relatively low and timber incomes are 
now relatively high. There is a further need for policy makers to engage with forest owners and 
educate them on the favourable economic status of commercially managing established woodlands 
in the UK in order to meet UK Governments prior commitments to promoting economic growth in the 
forest sector and increasing the recognisable value of the UK forest assets. 
4.1.6 Implications of the results of this study 
This study has shown that without government subsidy and grant incomes a decision to establish 
woodland cover on upland farmland is not an economically viable land use decision. Securing the 
future of support payments to farmers and landowners in the UK is going to become a significant 
issue in the coming months as the “Brexit” comes to fruition. The decision to leave the EU does 
present an opportunity to redevelop financial assistance to forest owners in UK, but it is likely that 
the relative uncertainty over the long term future of farm support payments is going to have a major 
impact on the forestry sector and in particular on new planting decisions by farmers and 
landowners.  
Considering the environmental potentials of Woodland cover, forests are relatively under monetised 
for their environmental benefits compared to agriculture which gains additional agri-environmental 
scheme income as well as direct EU subsidy. The direct payments (under Pillar 1 of the CAP) to 
farmers and landowners who hold land currently in agricultural production has historically accounted 
for the larger share of the EU CAP funding directed to the UK. Even though the proportion of the 
funding allocated to direct payments to farmers and landowners has been reduced in recent years 
through increased levels of modulation and allocation of funding to agri-environment schemes 
(under Pillar 2 of the Cap). The devolved UK Governments have stated on numerous occasions that 
there is an aspiration to reduce direct payments to farmers and landowners and for payments for 
environmental goods to account for a greater share of the budget. (DEFRA, 2013). There is an 
opportunity for the UK government to develop flexible payments for ecosystem services, carbon 
credits and hydrological regulation away.  The future of financial support and subsidies to agriculture 
and forestry will depend on how much of money previously paid to the EU is directed to agriculture 
and forestry upon exit of the EU. It awaits to be seen what priority the UK government gives to 
protecting the interests of UK farmers and foresters. It is unclear what priority is given to a new rural 
development budget (agri-environment schemes and forestry payments are made under the rural 
development budget under Pillar 2 of the CAP) and if the rural development budget will indeed 
increase or just account for a greater percentage of a smaller overall support budget for farmers and 
rural landowners. 
Rural development (including agriculture and forestry) is a devolved policy issue in the UK and 
matters regarding rural development funding post “Brexit” will be decided upon by each national 
government. An important element of the forthcoming debates will be whether there will be an 
agreement between each devolved government and central government over rural development 
budgets or if there will be full devolution of the future rural development decisions and budgets. It is 
likely that in the absence of a common administration framework (as previously existed under the 
EU CAP) that the divergence in the rural development schemes in each devolved nation will 
significantly increase. The future of rural development payments is likely to be increasingly 
influenced by the economic, environmental and social priorities of the devolved governments. 
Securing the future of grant payments for forestry is going to require significant influence from the 
forestry industry on national policy. Significant differences in the regional importance of the timber 
industry could lead to increased disparity on the national decisions regarding where to invest in 
woodland planting and management on farmland. 
The economic desirability of a decision to afforest farmland rather is linked to prevailing agricultural 
land prices (Glynn, 2016). Some observers note that direct payments to farmers under the basic 
payment scheme in the UK increases the value of agricultural land to the detriment of woodland 
planting decisions (Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen, 2014). The 2015/16 Defra Farm Business Income 
survey has shown that Less Favoured Area (LFA) grazing livestock businesses received on average 
£27,000 in subsidy payments (both BPS and agri-environment payments), contributing to an 
average net farm income of £19,000 (Defra, 2016). Our research along with the Defra Farm 
Business Income (Defra, 2016) has shown that without direct subsidy an average upland (LFA) farm 
in the UK would make a loss and be economically unviable. If the UK government does decide to 
reduce the level of direct payments to farmers and increase the level of spending on payments to 
landowners for environmental goods, it is conceivable that land prices may decline and increase the 
desirability and economic viability of afforestation on upland farmland.  
In addition, other potential reactions to reductions in direct farm subsidies might see the merger of 
farms, ranch style extensification and in some cases land abandonment. It is probable that most 
farmers and landowners will continue production on the most productive areas and areas with the 
greatest environmental value which are likely to continue to receive payments. The abandonment of 
agricultural production on marginal land may increases the relative attractiveness of a land use 
change in favour of woodland planting even though the first rotation will be economically unviable, it 
will secure a supplementary income for future rotations and generations. As a devolved government 
issue, and with the farming and forestry sectors representing differing shares of each national 
economy, it is probable that the actual outcome will vary greatly, leading to future disparity in the 
economic viability of farming and forestry in the uplands of the UK. It is likely that there will be vast 
regional disparity in the relative viability of farm forestry in the uplands of the UK based on the 
nature of the amended system of farm payments in the individual devolved nations of the UK. 
4.1.7 Limitations of the methodology 
The main approach to assessing forestry investment decisions by land owners is the use of 
traditional DCF techniques such as NPV and AEV. The academic literature noters that DCF analysis 
with many advantages over other investment evaluation methodologies (such as cost benefit 
analysis), notably that it is less vulnerable to accounting formalities, factors in risk and the time 
value of money and grants the same results despite the risk preference of the investor in that the 
results are economically rational and quantitative (Thomas, 2001; Mun, 2006; Regan et al., 2015). 
Whats more, DCF analysis does support effective decision making if the investment options 
(agriculture or forestry) fulfil some key assumptions. The traditional DCF approach is based on the 
assumption that investment options are under stable environmental conditions, the uncertainty is 
low enough and cash flows follow a consistent pattern to make reasonably precise cash flow 
forecasts. Whilst a DCF approach to comparison of continuation of agriculture and investment in 
forestry is a robust and widely accepted approach, there is the question as to whether the relative 
uncertainty over future timber and agricultural output prices violates the assumptions associated 
with DCF analysis. Furthermore , it is difficult to decide on what is the correct discount rate to use. It 
is well established that the higher the uncertainty associated with the land use options, the higher 
the discount rate should be used to reflecting a higher risk premium (Adler, 2000).  The results of 
this study have shown that the higher discount rate favours the agricultural option where incomes 
are annual, whereas the lower discount rate favours the forestry option. The higher discount rates 
greatly diminish later years cash flows where there is a large delay between expenditure and 
realisation of incomes. The DCF approach does also overlook qualitative benefits that frequently 
influence strategic land use investment decisions (Yeo & Qiu, 2003) 
The most significant drawbacks of using a DCF approach is it is static and linear in nature, it ignores 
future opportunities or strategic alternatives, regards investment decisions as now or never and the 
flexibility to modify decision as new opportunities arise is overlooked. (Duku-Kaakyire and Nanang, 
2004; Schachter & Mancarella, 2016). DCF methodology assumes that regardless of uncertainty a 
land use decision will be made and continuously operated until the end of its lifespan, which for 
forestry is the case, but for a decision to continue with agriculture based on a DCF approach 
overlooks the opportunity to turn land over to forestry in future years.  An alternative approach to 
comparison of strategic land use investments is the use of Real Options Analysis (ROA). A real 
options approach can be described as the right but not the obligation to make the strategic 
investment, moreover a ROA theory accepts the landowners ability to change a strategic land use 
investment project with the purpose of profit maximisation and risk minimisation ((Duku-Kaakyire 
and Nanang, 2004). The main advantage of a ROA compared to traditional DCF techniques is that it 
takes into account the ability to delay an irreversible invest (such as forestry) and its effect on the 
land use decision (Duku-Kaakyire and Nanang, 2004).  It is important to note that a ROA will not 
replace more traditional DCF approaches to investment decision making, an ROA approach should 
be applied as an additional analysis tool. ROA increases the overall understanding of effects of an 
investment and aids with the accounting of uncertainty that a DCF approach does not. As the 
objective of this study was not to understand the effects of a strategic land use investment on the 
landowners ability to explore other future investment the application of a traditional DCF approach 
applies well in this case. 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
By considering hypothetical scenarios in which farms of differing sizes opted out of upland sheep 
grazing into clear fell conifer forestry in either 1956, '76, '96 or 2016. The main finding of this study 
is that forestry is not more profitable that upland sheep farming in the absence of subsidy and grant 
incomes. Bio-economic modelling found that throughout 1950’s to the 1970’s, timber markets alone 
did not provide sufficient financial return for a switch to forestry compared to sheep farming, while 
sheep farming itself was also economically unviable without subsidy. Neither system was financially 
viable in terms of revenue generated through agricultural outputs alone. In contrast, timber markets 
in the 1990’s provided sufficient financial return for new woodland establishment to be economically 
viable without subsidy or grant incomes compared to a continuation of upland sheep farming which 
remained financially unviable based on revenues from agricultural outputs alone. Timber markets 
alone in 2016 provided insufficient financial return for new woodland establishment to be 
economically viable without subsidy or grant incomes while sheep farming itself was also 
economically unviable without subsidy. In the current prevailing economic climate, neither system is 
financially viable in terms of revenue generated through timber and agricultural outputs alone. 
There is a body of literature suggesting that grant assistance has little influence on landowner’s 
decisions to establish new woodland, but improved markets could influence expansion of woodland 
cover through new planting. With the addition of Basic Payment Scheme incomes continuation of 
upland agriculture in 2016 remains economically unviable whereas with addition of Woodland 
Creation Grant incomes conversion to forestry in 2016 would be economically viable and profitable. 
This study has shown that until markets significantly improve (in excess of a 26% increase in timber 
prices) a decision to plant new woodland in 2016 would not be economically viable and profitable 
unless farmers and landowners engage with grant assistance and receive the associated incomes. 
We are still well away from a point where favourable economics based on markets alone are likely 
to influence new planting of farm woodland in the uplands of the UK. Despite what is often reported 
about grant assistance having little influence on decision outcomes, many farmers are aware of 
rural policy priorities and the benefits and disadvantages of pursuing different management and land 
use options and the financial incentives attached to these. It is fair to say that many farmers take a 
considered view as to whether afforestation is an economically worthwhile land use change and the 
level of grant assistance available will play an important role in the decision making process among 
other factors (cultural resistance to turning farmland over to forestry, change in cash flow structure, 
and effect on land values).  
The conclusion can be drawn that addressing farmer’s cultural aversion to changing land use in 
favour of forestry and negative attitudes to grant scheme administration will be a major hurdle in 
meeting governments new woodland planting commitments. There is clearly a critical need for the 
UK government to address landowners’ concerns about the economic viability of upland forestry 
and reduce the red tape associated with grant incomes and improve awareness of the benefit of 
grant incomes in securing the economic viability of a decision to afforest farmland. Following the exit 
from the EU there is a good opportunity to redevelop farm subsidy payments in each of the 
devolved nations of the UK and ensure that the dichotomy between forestry and farming is 
breached. At the same time there is a need for the forestry and farming sectors to come together 
and explore the economic benefits of multifunctional land use and the economic viability of 
agroforestry systems in the UK Uplands. In particular there is a need to develop mechanisms to 
incentivise woodland creation on farms that provide sufficient scale for financial viability. In addition 
there is a need to develop financial instruments that could annualise future timber returns into 
regular payments for farmers, to whom incomes continuity is of higher importance than absolute 
capital return that might be the focus of inward investors in forestry. 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Appendix 1: Unit Costs and Revenues
Upland Agriculture unit costs and revenues
Commencing year 1956 1976 1996 2016
Agriculture VARIABLE unit costs
Ewe and ram replacements £/breeding ewe £0.22 £0.70 £2.00 £25.10
Concentrates £/breeding ewe £0.35 £1.10 £3.50 £15.00
Vet and med £/breeding ewe £0.16 £0.50 £2.80 £10.10
Miscellaneous £/breeding ewe £0.77 £2.40 £2.00 £13.70
Forage costs (inc bought in forage and keep) £/breeding ewe £0.29 £0.90 £3.40 £9.70
Agriculture FIXED unit costs
labour Small Med Lar Small Med Lar Small Med Lar Small Med Lar
Regular labour (paid) £/hectare
£24.00 £22.00 £22.00 £75.00 £70.00 £70.00
£65.00 £65.00 £65.00 £15.00 £20.00 £20.00
Regular labour (unpaid) £/hectare £95.00 £95.00 £95.00 £345.00 £230.00 £180.00
Casual labour £/hectare £10.00 £10.00 £10.00 £10.00 £10.00 £15.00
Power and machinery running costs
Machinery depreciation £/hectare
£17.00 £15.00 £15.00 £55.00 £50.00 £50.00
£40.00 £40.00 £40.00 £65.00 £55.00 £65.00
Machinery running costs £/hectare £45.00 £45.00 £45.00 £60.00 £55.00 £65.00
Contract charges £/hectare £20.00 £20.00 £20.00 £20.00 £20.00 £20.00
Miscellaneous
Farm maintenance £/hectare
£8.00 £6.00 £6.00 £25.00 £20.00 £20.00 £60.00 £60.00 £60.00
£15.00 £10.00 £15.00
Water and electricity £/hectare £40.00 £35.00 £35.00
General overhead expenses £/hectare £20.00 £20.00 £20.00
Rent and finance costs £/hectare £11.00 £11.00 £11.00 £35.00 £35.00 £35.00 £75.00 £75.00 £75.00 £40.00 £55.00 £60.00
Agriculture unit revenues
Lamb sales £/head £4.20 £13.00 £29.50 £62.00
Wool £/kg £0.30 £0.95 £1.00 £1.10
Cull ewes £/head £3.20 £12.50 £22.50 £45.00
Rams Sales £head £6.17 £22.50 £40.00 £75.00
Upland Forestry unit costs and revenues
Commencing year 1956 1976 1996 2016






Drainage £/hectare £20.00 £50.00 £90.00
Fencing £/m £0.03 £0.80 £5.00 £9.00
Tree planting
Bare rooted conifer £/1000 trees
£5.00
£9.00 £82.50 £285.00
Hand planting £/1000 trees £7.00 £145.00 £475.00
Tree Protection
Spiral and canes £/100 trees £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00
Maintenance




Plant supply £/hectare £22.00 £40.00 £120.00
Weeding
Spot weeding with herbicide £/hectare £14.00 £45.00 £75.00 £100.00
Thinning
Marking up first thinning £/m3 marked or £/hectare £0.04 £0.80 £40.00 £0.75
Marking up second thinning £/m3 marked or £/hectare £0.04 £0.80 £40.00 £0.75
Marking up third thinning £/m3 marked or £/hectare £0.04 £0.80 £40.00 £0.75
Marking up fourth thinning £/m3 marked or £/hectare £0.04 £0.80 £40.00 £0.75
Marking up fifth thinning £/m3 marked or £/hectare £0.04 £0.80 £40.00 £0.75
Marking up clear fell (1/10 of total area) £/m3 marked or £/hectare £0.04 £0.80 £300.00 £300.00
Other maintenance costs £/hectare £3.00 £20.00 £32.50 £75.00
Forestry FIXED unit costs
Miscellaneous Small Med Lar Small Med Lar Small Med Lar Small Med Lar
Maintenance £/hectare
£0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00
£0.00 £0.00 £0.00
Water and electricity £/hectare £0.00 £0.00 £0.00
General overhead expenses £/hectare £0.00 £0.00 £0.00
Rent and finance costs £/hectare £5.50 £5.50 £5.50 £17.50 £17.50 £17.50 £37.50 £37.50 £37.50 £20.00 £27.50 £30.00
Forestry unit revenues
Thinning (standing sale) £/m3 £0.50 £3.50 £14.00 £19.00
Final harvest (clear fell standing sale) £/m3 £2.10 £6.00 £21.00 £24.00
Appendix 2: Enterprise Budgets
Scenario 1: Budget for Upland Spring Lambing option
Year commencing 1956 1976 1996 2016
Farm Size  Small Medium Large Small Medium Large Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
Performance Data
Farm Size (ha) 90 230 470 90 230 470 90 230 470 90 230 470
Number of ewes 810 2070 4230 810 2070 4230 810 2070 4230 810 2070 4230
Number of rams (1 to 50 ewes) 16 41 85 16 41 85 16 41 85 16 41 85
Stocking rate (ewes per hectare) 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Fleece weight per ewe (kg) 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Cull Ewes (19%) 154 393 804 154 393 804 154 393 804 154 393 804
Ram Sales (19%) 3 8 16 3 8 16 3 8 16 3 8 16
Lambs sold per 100 ewes put to ram 45 45 45 45 45 45 75 75 75 141 141 141
Number of lambs sold 365 932 1904 365 932 1904 608 1553 3173 1142 2919 5964
Enterprise budget
Revenue
Lamb sales  £ 1,530.90  £ 3,912.30  £ 7,994.70  £ 4,738.50  £ 12,109.50  £ 24,745.50  £ 17,921.25  £ 45,798.75  £ 93,588.75  £ 70,810.20  £ 180,959.40  £ 369,786.60 
Wool  £ 413.10  £ 1,055.70  £ 2,157.30  £ 1,308.15  £ 3,343.05  £ 6,831.45  £ 1,377.00  £ 3,519.00  £ 7,191.00  £ 1,514.70  £ 3,870.90  £ 7,910.10 
Cull ewes  £ 492.48  £ 1,258.56  £ 2,571.84  £ 1,923.75  £ 4,916.25  £ 10,046.25  £ 3,462.75  £ 8,849.25  £ 18,083.25  £ 6,925.50  £ 17,698.50  £ 36,166.50 
Rams Sales  £ 18.99  £ 48.53  £ 99.18  £ 69.26  £ 176.99  £ 361.67  £ 123.12  £ 314.64  £ 642.96  £ 230.85  £ 589.95  £ 1,205.55 
Variable costs
Ewe and ram replacements  £ 178.20  £ 455.40  £ 930.60  £ 567.00  £ 1,449.00  £ 2,961.00  £ 1,620.00  £ 4,140.00  £ 8,460.00  £ 20,331.00  £ 51,957.00  £ 106,173.00 
Concentrates  £ 283.50  £ 724.50  £ 1,480.50  £ 891.00  £ 2,277.00  £ 4,653.00  £ 2,835.00  £ 7,245.00  £ 14,805.00  £ 12,150.00  £ 31,050.00  £ 63,450.00 
Vet and med  £ 129.60  £ 331.20  £ 676.80  £ 405.00  £ 1,035.00  £ 2,115.00  £ 2,268.00  £ 5,796.00  £ 11,844.00  £ 8,181.00  £ 20,907.00  £ 42,723.00 
Miscellaneous  £ 623.70  £ 1,593.90  £ 3,257.10  £ 1,944.00  £ 4,968.00  £ 10,152.00  £ 1,620.00  £ 4,140.00  £ 8,460.00  £ 11,097.00  £ 28,359.00  £ 57,951.00 




 £ 2,160.00  £ 5,060.00  £ 10,340.00  £ 6,750.00  £ 16,100.00  £ 32,900.00 
 £ 5,850.00  £ 14,950.00  £ 30,550.00  £ 1,350.00  £ 4,600.00  £ 9,400.00 
Regular labour (unpaid)  £ 8,550.00  £ 21,850.00  £ 44,650.00  £ 31,050.00  £ 52,900.00  £ 84,600.00 
Casual labour  £ 900.00  £ 2,300.00  £ 4,700.00  £ 900.00  £ 2,300.00  £ 7,050.00 
Power and machinery running costs
Machinery depreciation
 £ 1,530.00  £ 3,450.00  £ 7,050.00  £ 4,950.00  £ 11,500.00  £ 23,500.00 
 £ 3,600.00  £ 9,200.00  £ 18,800.00  £ 5,850.00  £ 12,650.00  £ 30,550.00 
Machinery running costs  £ 4,050.00  £ 10,350.00  £ 21,150.00  £ 5,400.00  £ 12,650.00  £ 30,550.00 
Contract charges  £ 1,800.00  £ 4,600.00  £ 9,400.00  £ 1,800.00  £ 4,600.00  £ 9,400.00 
Miscellaneous
Farm maintenance
 £ 720.00  £ 1,380.00  £ 2,820.00  £ 2,250.00  £ 4,600.00  £ 9,400.00  £ 5,400.00  £ 13,800.00  £ 28,200.00 
 £ 1,350.00  £ 2,300.00  £ 7,050.00 
Water and electricity  £ 3,600.00  £ 8,050.00  £ 16,450.00 
General overhead expenses  £ 1,800.00  £ 4,600.00  £ 9,400.00 
Rent and finance costs  £ 990.00  £ 2,530.00  £ 5,170.00  £ 3,150.00  £ 8,050.00  £ 16,450.00  £ 6,750.00  £ 17,250.00  £ 35,250.00  £ 3,600.00  £ 12,650.00  £ 28,200.00 
Scenario 2: Budget for Upland Forestry option
Year commencing 1956 1976 1996 2016
Farm Size Small Medium Large Small Medium Large Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
Performance Data
Plantation size 90 230 470 90 230 470 90 230 470 90 230 470
Fenced length 3800 6100 8700 3800 6100 8700 3800 6100 8700 3800 6100 8700
Stocking rate (trees/ha) 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500
First thinning (m3/ha-1) 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
Second thinning (m3/ha-1) 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Third thinning (m3/ha-1) 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
Fourth thinning (m3/ha-1) 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
Fifth thinning (m3/ha-1) 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
Final harvest (m3/ha-1) 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 426
Enterprise budget
Revenue
First thinning  £ 1,980.00  £ 5,060.00  £ 10,340.00  £ 13,860.00  £ 35,420.00  £ 72,380.00  £ 55,440.00  £ 141,680.00  £ 289,520.00  £ 75,240.00  £ 192,280.00  £ 392,920.00 
Second thinning  £ 2,115.00  £ 5,405.00  £ 11,045.00  £ 14,805.00  £ 37,835.00  £ 77,315.00  £ 59,220.00  £ 151,340.00  £ 309,260.00  £ 80,370.00  £ 205,390.00  £ 419,710.00 
Third thinning  £ 1,980.00  £ 5,060.00  £ 10,340.00  £ 13,860.00  £ 35,420.00  £ 72,380.00  £ 55,440.00  £ 141,680.00  £ 289,520.00  £ 75,240.00  £ 192,280.00  £ 392,920.00 
Fourth thinning  £ 2,205.00  £ 5,635.00  £ 11,515.00  £ 15,435.00  £ 39,445.00  £ 80,605.00  £ 61,740.00  £ 157,780.00  £ 322,420.00  £ 83,790.00  £ 214,130.00  £ 437,570.00 
Fifth thinning  £ 2,205.00  £ 5,635.00  £ 11,515.00  £ 15,435.00  £ 39,445.00  £ 80,605.00  £ 61,740.00  £ 157,780.00  £ 322,420.00  £ 83,790.00  £ 214,130.00  £ 437,570.00 
Final harvest  £ 8,051.40  £ 20,575.80  £ 42,046.20  £ 23,004.00  £ 58,788.00  £ 120,132.00  £ 80,514.00  £ 205,758.00  £ 420,462.00  £ 92,016.00  £ 235,152.00  £ 480,528.00 
Final harvest  £ 8,051.40  £ 20,575.80  £ 42,046.20  £ 23,004.00  £ 58,788.00  £ 120,132.00  £ 80,514.00  £ 205,758.00  £ 420,462.00  £ 92,016.00  £ 235,152.00  £ 480,528.00 
Final harvest  £ 8,051.40  £ 20,575.80  £ 42,046.20  £ 23,004.00  £ 58,788.00  £ 120,132.00  £ 80,514.00  £ 205,758.00  £ 420,462.00  £ 92,016.00  £ 235,152.00  £ 480,528.00 
Final harvest  £ 8,051.40  £ 20,575.80  £ 42,046.20  £ 23,004.00  £ 58,788.00  £ 120,132.00  £ 80,514.00  £ 205,758.00  £ 420,462.00  £ 92,016.00  £ 235,152.00  £ 480,528.00 
Final harvest  £ 8,051.40  £ 20,575.80  £ 42,046.20  £ 23,004.00  £ 58,788.00  £ 120,132.00  £ 80,514.00  £ 205,758.00  £ 420,462.00  £ 92,016.00  £ 235,152.00  £ 480,528.00 
Final harvest  £ 8,051.40  £ 20,575.80  £ 42,046.20  £ 23,004.00  £ 58,788.00  £ 120,132.00  £ 80,514.00  £ 205,758.00  £ 420,462.00  £ 92,016.00  £ 235,152.00  £ 480,528.00 
Final harvest  £ 8,051.40  £ 20,575.80  £ 42,046.20  £ 23,004.00  £ 58,788.00  £ 120,132.00  £ 80,514.00  £ 205,758.00  £ 420,462.00  £ 92,016.00  £ 235,152.00  £ 480,528.00 
Final harvest  £ 8,051.40  £ 20,575.80  £ 42,046.20  £ 23,004.00  £ 58,788.00  £ 120,132.00  £ 80,514.00  £ 205,758.00  £ 420,462.00  £ 92,016.00  £ 235,152.00  £ 480,528.00 
Final harvest  £ 8,051.40  £ 20,575.80  £ 42,046.20  £ 23,004.00  £ 58,788.00  £ 120,132.00  £ 80,514.00  £ 205,758.00  £ 420,462.00  £ 92,016.00  £ 235,152.00  £ 480,528.00 




Ploughing  £ 2,250.00  £ 5,750.00  £ 11,750.00  £ 5,400.00  £ 13,800.00  £ 28,200.00  £ 9,000.00  £ 23,000.00  £ 47,000.00  £ 15,300.00  £ 39,100.00  £ 79,900.00 
Drainage  £ 1,800.00  £ 4,600.00  £ 9,400.00  £ 4,500.00  £ 11,500.00  £ 23,500.00  £ 8,100.00  £ 20,700.00  £ 42,300.00 
Fencing  £ 114.00  £ 183.00  £ 261.00  £ 3,040.00  £ 4,880.00  £ 6,960.00  £ 19,000.00  £ 30,500.00  £ 43,500.00  £ 34,200.00  £ 54,900.00  £ 78,300.00 
Tree planting
Bare rooted conifer  £ 1,125.00  £ 2,875.00  £ 5,875.00  £ 2,025.00  £ 5,175.00  £ 10,575.00  £ 18,562.50  £ 47,437.50  £ 96,937.50  £ 64,125.00  £ 163,875.00  £ 334,875.00 
Hand planting  £ 1,575.00  £ 4,025.00  £ 8,225.00  £ 32,625.00  £ 83,375.00  £ 170,375.00  £ 106,875.00  £ 273,125.00  £ 558,125.00 
Tree Protection
Spiral and canes  £ -    £ -    £ -    £ -    £ -    £ -    £ -    £ -    £ -    £ -    £ -    £ -   
Maintenance
Replacing dead trees (beating up)
Operation  £ 900.00  £ 2,300.00  £ 4,700.00  £ 1,530.00  £ 3,910.00  £ 7,990.00  £ 3,150.00  £ 8,050.00  £ 16,450.00  £ 14,850.00  £ 37,950.00  £ 77,550.00 
Plant supply  £ 1,980.00  £ 5,060.00  £ 10,340.00  £ 3,600.00  £ 9,200.00  £ 18,800.00  £ 10,800.00  £ 27,600.00  £ 56,400.00 
Weeding
Spot weeding with herbicide  £ 1,260.00  £ 3,220.00  £ 6,580.00  £ 4,050.00  £ 10,350.00  £ 21,150.00  £ 6,750.00  £ 17,250.00  £ 35,250.00  £ 9,000.00  £ 23,000.00  £ 47,000.00 
Thinning
Marking up first thinning  £ 158.40  £ 404.80  £ 827.20  £ 3,168.00  £ 8,096.00  £ 16,544.00  £ 3,600.00  £ 9,200.00  £ 18,800.00  £ 2,970.00  £ 7,590.00  £ 15,510.00 
Marking up second thinning  £ 169.20  £ 432.40  £ 883.60  £ 3,384.00  £ 8,648.00  £ 17,672.00  £ 3,600.00  £ 9,200.00  £ 18,800.00  £ 3,172.50  £ 8,107.50  £ 16,567.50 
Marking up third thinning  £ 158.40  £ 404.80  £ 827.20  £ 3,168.00  £ 8,096.00  £ 16,544.00  £ 3,600.00  £ 9,200.00  £ 18,800.00  £ 2,970.00  £ 7,590.00  £ 15,510.00 
Marking up fourth thinning  £ 158.40  £ 450.80  £ 921.20  £ 3,528.00  £ 8,096.00  £ 18,424.00  £ 3,600.00  £ 9,200.00  £ 18,800.00  £ 3,307.50  £ 8,452.50  £ 17,272.50 
Marking up fifth thinning  £ 176.40  £ 450.80  £ 921.20  £ 3,528.00  £ 9,016.00  £ 18,424.00  £ 3,600.00  £ 9,200.00  £ 18,800.00  £ 3,307.50  £ 8,452.50  £ 17,272.50 
Marking up clear fell (1/10 of total area)  £ 153.36  £ 391.92  £ 800.88  £ 3,067.20  £ 7,838.40  £ 16,017.60  £ 2,700.00  £ 6,900.00  £ 14,100.00  £ 2,700.00  £ 6,900.00  £ 14,100.00 




 £ -    £ -    £ -    £ -    £ -    £ -    £ -    £ -    £ -   
 £ -    £ -    £ -   
Water and electricity  £ -    £ -    £ -   
General overhead expenses  £ -    £ -    £ -   
Rent and finance costs  £ 495.00  £ 1,265.00  £ 2,585.00  £ 1,575.00  £ 4,025.00  £ 8,225.00  £ 3,375.00  £ 8,625.00  £ 17,625.00  £ 1,800.00  £ 6,325.00  £ 14,100.00 
